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Abstract
It is argued that at a sufficiently deep level the conventional quantitative
approach to the study of nature faces difficult problems, and that biological
processes should be seen as more fundamental, in a way that can be
elaborated on the basis of Peircean semiotics and Yardley’s Circular Theory.
In such a world-view, Wheeler’s observer-participation and emergent law
arise naturally, rather than having to be imposed artificially. This points the
way to a deeper understanding of nature, where meaning has a fundamental
role to play that is invisible to quantitative science.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that nature can be described in terms of fixed
mathematical laws. However, the discovery that the Standard Model cannot
be reconciled with general relativity in a straightforward way has created
problems for this point of view. An alternative is Wheeler’s proposal to the
effect that participation by observers, as postulated in some formulations
of quantum mechanics, is the mechanism whereby physical laws emerge.
According to Wheeler, that principle might suffice to build everything[2].
In Wheeler’s article the gap between acts of observer-participancy and
physical reality was not filled in, an insufficiency that we attribute to the
absence of an appropriate theory of observation. In the following we discuss
a biologically oriented scheme where observation plays a central role, and
show how it can lead to the emergence of physical laws.
The structure of this scheme can be summarised as
primordial reality → circular mechanics → semiotics and structure →
technological development → regulatory mechanisms → emergent laws.
Here ‘circular mechanics’ is a reference to a generic scheme of biological
organisation proposed by Yardley[3], encompassing among its aspects sign
processes in accord with the semiosis concepts of Peirce[4], which in turn
underlie processes of a technological character, among which we hypothesise
are the capacity to form systems such as our universe, to which laws of
a mathematical kind are applicable. In this way, we are able to link life,
viewed from a generic point of view, to the origin of universes.
We discuss first of all the relationship between idealised situations
in physics which can be characterised precisely in mathematical terms
on the one hand and on the other, biology, which it will be argued is
primarily concerned with patterns and only secondarily with quantities.
The characteristics of biosystems are then related to the forward-looking
role of signs, and to circular theory approach, thus paving the way to a
more detailed analysis of universe generation.
2 Physics vs. biology; mathematics vs. semiosis
Theoretical physics is mathematics-based, typically involving differential
equations with respect to time. Such a mathematical approach carries the
presumption that systems found in nature can be represented adequately
by explicit formulae. Experimental biology gives the appearance of demon-
strating the derivability of life from conventional physics, such investigations
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uncovering a great variety of processes that accord with known physics as
well as having biological functions. However, things are not what they
seem. To see this, compare life with a phenomenon of physics such as
superconductivity. In the latter case there is a specific model, the BCS
model, defined by a specific mathematical expression, which accords well
with many experimental observations. Small changes in the model would
have small consequences, and would not affect this agreement. Biosystems
differ in that fine details may drastically affect behaviour; rather than there
being a specific model there is a landscape of possibilities, with only the
peaks reflecting viable systems. Thus the properties of biosystems cannot
be accounted for on the basis of a first-principles computation, which could
not apply to such a landscape.
Biosystems must therefore be addressed in a way different from the way
systems that are the subject of mathematical physics are normally studied.
They can be conceived of as systems that have passed certain tests, a
situation similar to that of prime numbers, where in general a number
can be shown to be prime only by testing for factors, rather than there
being a formula that generates all primes. Despite the absence of such
a formula, passing such tests has important implications. The situation
addressed by Go¨del, whereby there exist true statements that cannot be
proved starting from specified axioms, is similar in the way it demonstrates
limits of specifiability. In the biosystem case, the test-passing factor is
related to viability, and is also responsible for different instances of an
organism behaving similarly, which permits their non-quantitative analysis.
3 The forward-looking aspect of life; semiosis
One way in which life differs from nature is general is the way it creates its
own structures, in a way that does not admit of any very direct mathematical
interpretation. Rather, in life we find systems that have come into existence
that are able to pass particular tests, as required for the survival of the
given system. One aspect of this is the semiosis discussed by Peirce[4],
Semiotics empasises the role of information processing and more specifically
the importance of the interpretation of signs, in the light of the fact that
at the cognitive level the appropriate use and interpretation of signs is
essential. In Peirce’s scheme there is a specific, possibly context dependent,
relationship between signs, and objects to which they are linked, with a
third element, the interpretant, having the role of linking them. Typically,
a complicated interpretant mechanism links the simpler sign and object,
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reliably producing a well defined situation linked to the sign.
The role played by signs in biological situations can be illustrated by the
situation of road traffic. The fact that cars collide with each other much less
frequently than if they were driven at random can be related to appropriate
interpretation of the relevant signs. Large quantitative changes can be made,
and the collision-avoidance phenomenon remains. This phenomenon, in a
more general context, makes biology ‘a different game’ to ordinary physics.
Signs play an important role in advanced activities through the way
complicated signs open up new possibilities, the power of natural language
providing a simple illustration of this fact.
The question now arises how semiotic processes manifest and develop,
and whether this can happen in the primoridal context which we imagine to
be the source of universes and physical laws. A more global perspective is
required, and we now discuss this in the light of Yardley’s Circular Theory.
4 Application of Circular Theory
Circular Theory[3] is a work in progress, aimed at expressing structure and
function in biological systems in its most basic conceptual form, the key
elements being units (‘circles’), links between units, and the tendency for
units to form (unitisation).
We first discuss the terms unit and link. Unit is not defined in rigorous
terms, the existence of units being something that is discovered though
attempts to characterise systems of interest; a unit is something that it
is convenient to treat as a whole. The concept of a unit may usefully be
extended to refer to classes that it is convenient to deal with in an analysis,
and it may equally well be applied to processes.
Turning to the concept of link, what is crucial in circular theory is the
way systems are able to work together, acting effectively as a single system.
A simple example is provided by a thermostatically controlled system, where
a controller, together with a controlled system whose temperature is subject
to variation from external inputs, become a system with approximately fixed
temperature, while a more complicated case consists in a function present
in a computer as a part of a program, interacting with some other system so
as to exercise that function. A server-client situation such as a web browser
interacting with a web server illustrates on the other hand a situation of
mutual influence. The point is that there is a special kind of situation
of ‘systems being attuned to each other’ that produces highly coordinated
behaviour, and this is very relevant to mechanisms and to life generally. Yet
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another example is the correlation between the two strands of DNA, in which
case the correlations are put to work in the service of copying information.
Intuitively (no attempt will be made here to formulate the concepts
rigorously), the point is that the coupling between the systems concerned
reduces the range of variation available to the joint system, while still
making degrees of freedom available. Arguably, this will tend to happen
spontaneously under certain circumstances (as when two clocks are coupled
by placing them on a common platform). This coordination may also be
induced by a third influence, as happens during learning involving the
development of coordination between two processes.
A packing model
The concepts of circular theory, including the ‘attunement’ concept, can
be underpinned by an idea to the effect that what is involved at root
is the packing together of a set of dynamical systems subject to certain
constraints; indeed learning involves the attempt to make systems that are
interacting generate activity that conforms to particular constraints. As
an implementation mechanism, we suppose that in place of fixed structures
we are concerned in each case with a collection of structures distinguished
from each other by a set of bits, which are adjusted bit by bit until a high
degree of conformance to the relevant constraints is achieved. This process
is equivalent to that of Ross Ashby’s ultrastability[5].
We can take the idea further by invoking an additional system that can
pack other structures together ‘intelligently’, that is to say by recognising
signs and responding appropriately, in the manner of semiotic theory. Such a
grouping of three systems can be expected to cohere together more effectively
than with situations where there is no such intelligent response to signs.
With such a grouping there is no essential difference between the three
components, and all three can be considered interpretants, each interpreting
signs originating in the other two systems, and also the interactions between
these two.
Conversely, the splitting of a unit into three subunits brings into
existence a triadic situation of the kind discussed by Peirce. What remains
when systems disperse in this way is the potential to bond with systems
similar to those with which they have previously formed the capacity to
bond. In this way we can understand creative development, where new
structures form, with new capacities.
These points can be illustrated with analogies from chemistry: (i) if a
molecule A can split into two specific molecules B and C, then in a different
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environment B and C can combine again to form A; (ii) in an extension
of the idea, we consider A splitting into three consitutents B, C and D.
In the context of recombination, D can act as a catalyst holding B and C
in the correct configuration to enable all three to bond together; (iii) the
point about bonding of similar systems is illustrated by the way that if one
halogen can bond in a particular place in a specific molecule then a different
halogen is likely also to be able to bond in the same place.
5 Universality, fractality and ‘turtles all the way
down’
Two complementary forms of change to be considered in the above picture
are (i) systems joining together to form one unit, and (ii) a system splitting
into a number of units. This leads to the possibility of a fractal, or scale-free,
situation where similar structures exist at all scales. In this context, some
signs would have a universal significance at all levels. However, as systems
become more complex, differentiation and specialisation start to occur.
If the multiple scale picture is correct, we would have a situation where
details are governed by finer details which are governed by finer details and
so on ad infinitum, in conformity with the ‘turtles all the way down’ concept
[6].
6 Cognitive and cultural development
We first recall what the purpose of the discussion of semiosis and the circular
theory has been. The idea was to be able to treat universe generation as,
in essence, a kind of technological development. The familiar technological
development is a product of human beings and brains, and clearly cannot be
used to account for universe generation, but our discussion of development
in terms of semiosis and circular theory indicates that something analogous
to cognitive development (including cultural development, assuming that
cognitive development, in a social system, provides a basis for cultural
emergence) can occur in a wider context, including that of our postulated
primordial system.
The hypothesis then is that primordial constructs of various levels
of complexity can form, whose links with other systems including their
environment can be equated with ‘knowing’. What might such systems come
to know? If their culture acts on the basis of perceived benefit only (as is
tending to become the norm in our modern society), then such developments
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may have limited outcomes. If wider explorations are not excluded, then
developments such as mathematics are possible, which might then be applied
to such scientific knowledge as might be discoverable, and subsequently
in technological applications including, it is hypothesised, mathematically
governed universes that could be beneficial to life.
Outliers
In this connection, Yardley (private communication) notes that an important
role in determining the general direction of development is played by outliers,
that is to say situations encountered that have not yet made effective links
with existing structures. Chance contacts may cause new structures to be
built, which structures may on occasion be applicable in a wide range of
situations, leading to more extended developments.
Mathematical precision
One important issue is how mathematical precision emerges from a system
that is initially very imprecise. We can usefully consider in this connection
Euclidean geometry, a mathematically precise system that emerged through
the consideration of properties of the world that were not known with any
great precision. Geometry, like any mathematical enterprise, is a symbolic
activity that does not depend in any essential way on interaction with
the world. It was, nevertheless, inspired by knowledge of real point-like
objects and approximate straight lines. By retreating into symbolism one
escapes inconvenient facts about the world and is able to create a system
that has a certain resemblance to the world even though there is no exact
correspondence. The Euclidean plane, is in essence, a fantasy that one can
address through symbols even though the real world does not correspond
exactly to it. However, in this case the correspondences between the
Euclidean world and the real world are sufficiently close that Euclidean
geometry is of value in the real world, but this is something that has to be
discovered through observation rather than taken for granted.
Generation of space and physical universes
In our ordinary world, Euclidean geometry is simply a system that provides
a good model for phenomena in space, using specialised techniques to
connect the model with the reality. From the perspective of our primordial
community, it conversely provides a model for forming a universe-system
(more generally, physical laws provide a basis for forming the corresponding
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physical reality). The model is not the technology, any more than
understanding the sphere equates to the existence of physical spheres. We
hypothesise however that some such technology, which in due course we may
ourselves be able to understand, was discovered at the primordial level, and
forms the basis upon which physical universes are generated. Mathematical
precision exists only in the world of discourse, and is realised to whatever
degree is possible by technology.
Symmetry and symmetry breaking may play a key role here, in view of
the fact that conceptually symmetry is defined in terms of transformations
that may have physical correlates, while at the same time symmetry is found
to play an important role in actual physics.
In this picture locality is understood as an emergent property, analogous
to the frequency of a physical process. Just as in some circumstances fre-
quencies of physical processes become well defined, with different frequencies
becoming independent of each other as far as linkages are concerned, in
this case location becomes a well defined quantity, with different locations
becoming independent of each other. Quantum entanglement and wholeness,
on the other hand, would be derivative of the units of circular theory. More
generally, the high degree of correlation associated with the packing model
can be expected to be manifested in phenomena similar to those associated
with quantum mechanics.
7 Discussion
We have addressed in a natural way Wheeler’s question of how observer-
participation can lead to the emergence of specific laws of nature in
particular systems. The key point is the fact that the interpretation of
signs changes the game, facilitating the emergence of new kinds of system
and process, which are correlates of cognitive and cultural development
that, in the present context, lead to emergent laws. In this picture, the
responsible system or systems are the determiners of the observed laws,
rather than the laws concerned being presumed absolute, or derivable from
some mathematical analysis.
One can imagine a scenario whereby conventional science would be forced
similarly to renounce the idea of a Final Theory. We already have a situation
where some theory X (e.g. the Standard Model) proves inadequate and
theory Y (e.g. string theory) is proposed to take its place. Then certain
further issues lead to the idea that the real ‘fundamental theory’ is Z (e.g.
M-theory). At each stage, however, the supposed fundamental theory gets
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farther from what is accessible by experiment, and its connections with
reality become more obscure.
The idea that nature at some deeper level has biological aspects is not
fundamentally absurd, and has been previously explored by authors such as
Smolin[7] and Pattee[8]. The above analysis has explored some aspects of the
‘biological logic’ applicable to such a scenario, in particular the mechanics
of development, which could lead to what might be termed ‘extended
mind’. Faculties such as mathematical intuition, difficult to account for
in conventional ways, might be manifestations of the extended mind, which
might also be related to experiences of meaning in art.
To what extent can these proposals be considered scientific in character?
While the absence of a fixed, universal mathematical law may seem at first
sight to be a radical departure from scientific tradition, the idea that the
laws manifested in the laboratory are emergent rather than fundamental is
already a feature of string theory. And, as practiced, biology is a science
that makes extensive use of phenomenology (e.g. that of chemical reactions),
and concepts specific to biology, and typically makes less use of the methods
of theoretical physics (i.e. mathematical models).
A typical biological concept is the idea that particular systems (e.g.
the immune system) have particular functions. Such concepts have value
in interpreting what one finds and in guiding investigations. The ideas
expounded here can be expected to be of similar value in constructing models
where conventional methods prove inadequate.
Some scientists have accepted the idea that not everything can be
characterised in quantitative terms, asserting however that the only real
knowledge is that based on scientific measurement; but alternatives [1, 9],
offering a broader understanding of what constitutes knowledge, are possible.
The present discussion offers some insight into what is involved in that latter
position. Nature is pervaded by patterns (signs) which through practice we
have become expert in interpreting, a process that has pragmatic value even
if it is not amenable to the traditional quantitative methodology. If the
picture developed here is correct, there is much more in the way of meaning
to be found in the natural world by such means than can be found through
the traditional methodology of science.
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